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Abstract
We consider a new model of a TU game endowed with both coalition and two-
level cooperation structures that applies to various network situations. The
approach to the value is close to that of both Myerson [1977] and Aumann
and Dre`ze [1974]: it is based on ideas of component efficiency and one or
another deletion link property, and it treats an a priori union as a self-contained
unit; moreover, our approach incorporates also the idea of the Owen’s quotient
game property [1977]. The axiomatically introduced values possess an explicit
formula representation and in many cases can be quite simply computed. The
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1 Introduction
The study of TU games with coalition structure was initiated first by Aumann and
Dre`ze [2], then Owen [11]. Later this approach was extended in Winter [15] to games
with level structure. Another model of a game with limited cooperation presented by
means of a communication graph was introduced in Myerson [10]. Various studies in
both directions were done during the last three decades but mostly either within one
model or another. The generalization of the Owen and the Myerson values, applied
to the combination of both models that resulted in a TU game with both independent
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coalition and cooperation structures, was investigated by Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-
Jurado, and Carreras [14].
In the paper we study TU games with both coalition and cooperation struc-
tures, the so-called graph games with coalition structure. Different from [14], in
our case a cooperation structure is a two-level cooperation structure and it relates
fundamentally to the given coalition structure. It is assumed that cooperation (via
bilateral agreements between participants) is only possible either among the entire
coalitions of the coalition structure, in other terms a priori unions, or among single
players within a priori unions. No communication and therefore no cooperation
are allowed between single players from distinct elements of the coalition structure.
This approach allows to model various network situations, in particular, telecom-
munication problems, distribution of goods among different cities (countries) along
highway networks connecting the cities and local road networks within the cities, or
sharing an international river with multiple users but without international firms,
i.e., when no cooperation is possible among single users located at different levels
along the river, and so on. A two-level cooperation structure is introduced by means
of graphs of two types, first, presenting links among a priori unions of the coalition
structure and second, presenting links among players within each a priori union.
We consider cooperation structures presented by combinations of graphs of differ-
ent types – general undirected graphs, cycle-free graphs, line-graphs with linearly
ordered players.
Our main concern is to justify the solution concepts reflecting a two-stage dis-
tribution procedure. It is assumed that at first, a priori unions through upper level
bargaining based only on cumulative interests of all members of every entire a priori
union involved when nobody’s personal interests are taken into account, collect their
total shares. Thereafter, via bargaining within a priori unions based now on per-
sonal interests of participants, the collected shares are distributed to single players.
Our approach to the value is close to that of both Myerson [10] and Aumann and
Dre`ze [2]: it is based on ideas of component efficiency and one or another deletion
link property, and it treats an a priori union as a self-contained unit. Moreover, to
link both communication levels between and within a priori unions we incorporate
the idea of the Owen’s quotient game property [11]. Our approach combines models
of Myerson, Aumann-Dre`ze, and Owen, and is also strongly influenced by works of
Brink, Laan, and Vasil’ev [4] over solutions for line-graph games, of Herings, Laan,
and Talman [7] introducing the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games, and
of Slikker [13] providing an axiomatization of the position value [9], [3]. The sug-
gested in the paper unified approach to several component efficient values for games
with cooperation structure, in other terms graph games, allows to apply within
the unique framework different combinations of known solutions concepts for graph
games, first at the level of entire a priori unions, and then at the level within a priori
unions. The incorporation of different solutions not only aims to enrich the solution
concept for the introduced model of a graph game with coalition structure. In many
cases depending on the type of the graph structure under scrutiny it leads as well to
more efficient computational algorithms than application of the only combination
of the Myerson values at both levels. Besides, it also opens a practical application
to the problem of sharing of an international river with multiple users.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are in-
troduced in Sect. 2. Sect. 3 is devoted to the definition of a graph game with coali-
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tion structure. Sect. 4 provides the uniform approach to several known values for
graph games. In Sect. 5 we introduce values for graph games with coalition structure
axiomatically and show that they possess an explicit formula representation, we in-
vestigate also stability and distribution of Harsanyi dividends. Sect. 6 deals with
the generalization on graph games with level structure. In Sect. 7 we discuss appli-
cation to the water distribution problem of an international river among multiple
users without international firms.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU games and values
Recall some definitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU game) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and
v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying
v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2N ) of s players is called a coalition, and
the associated real number v(S) presents the worth of the coalition S. The set
of all games with a fixed player set N we denote GN . For simplicity of notation
and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of 〈N, v〉 when refer to a game.
We also use standard notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi and xS = {xi}i∈S , for all x ∈ IRn,
S ⊆ N . A value is an operator ξ : GN → IRn that assigns to any game v ∈ GN a
vector ξ(v) ∈ IRn; the real number ξi(v) represents the payoff to the player i in the
game v. A subgame of a game v with a player set T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, is a game v|T
defined as v|T (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . We say that a game v is superadditive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N , such that S ∩ T = ∅. A game v is convex
if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N .
It is well known [12] that unanimity games {uT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
, defined as uT (S) = 1 if
T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise, create a basis for the game space GN , i.e., every
game v ∈ GN can be uniquely presented in the linear form v =
∑
T⊆N,T 6=∅
λvT uT , where
λvT =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−s v(S), for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅. Following Harsanyi [6] the coefficient
λvT is referred to as a dividend of the coalition T in the game v.
For a permutation pi : N → N , assigning rank number pi(i) ∈ N to a player i ∈ N ,
let pii = {j ∈ N |pi(j) ≤ pi(i)} be the set of all players with rank number smaller or
equal to the rank number of i, including i itself. The marginal contribution vector
mpi(v) ∈ IRn of a game v and a permutation pi is given by mpii (v) = v(pii)−v(pii\{i}),
i ∈ N . By u we denote the permutation on N relevant to the natural ordering from
1 to n, i.e., u(i) = i, i ∈ N , and by l the permutation relevant to the reverse ordering
n, n− 1, . . . , 1, i.e., l(i) = n+ 1− i, i ∈ N .
The Shapley value [12] of a game v ∈ GN can be given by
Shi(v) =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
λvT
t
, for all i ∈ N.
The core [5] of a game v ∈ GN is defined as
C(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
A value ξ is stable if for any superadditive v ∈ GN , ξ(v) belongs to the core C(v).
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2.2 Games with coalition structure
A coalition structure or, in other terms, a system of a priori unions on a player set N
is given by a partition P = {N1, ..., Nm} of the player set N , i.e., N1 ∪ ...∪Nm = N
and Nk ∩ Nl = ∅ for k 6= l. A pair 〈v,P〉 of a game v ∈ GN and a coalition
structure P on the player set N constitutes a game with coalition structure or, in
other terms, a game with a priori unions or simply P-game. The set of all games
endowed with a coalition structure on a fixed player set N we denote GPN . A P-value
is an operator ξ : GPN → IRn that associates with a P-game 〈v, P 〉 ∈ GPN a vector of
payoffs ξ(v,P) ∈ IRn. For a given game with coalition structure 〈v,P〉, Owen [11]
defines a game vP , called a quotient game, between a priori unions on the player set
M = {1, . . . ,m} in which each coalition Nk acts as a player:
vP(Q) = v(
⋃
k∈Q
Nk), for all Q ⊆M.
Notice that the pair 〈v, {N}〉 of a game v and the coalition structure {N} containing
only one element – the grand coalition, represents the same situation as the game v
itself. Later on by 〈N〉 we denote the coalition structure containing only singletons,
i.e., 〈N〉 = {{1}, . . . , {n}}. Furthermore, for any i ∈ N by k(i) we denote the index
of the element of coalition structure containing i, i.e., i ∈ Nk(i). For any payoff
vector x ∈ IRn, the vector of total payoffs to all a priori unions we denote by xP ,
i.e., xP =
(
x(Nk)
)
k∈M ∈ IRm.
2.3 Games with cooperation structure
A cooperation structure on a player set N is specified by a graph L without loops,
undirected or directed. An undirected graph is a collection of unordered pairs of
nodes/players L ⊆ LcN = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}, where LcN is the complete
undirected graph on N and an unordered pair {i, j} presents a link between i, j ∈ N .
A directed graph is a collection of directed links L ⊆ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. A pair
〈v, L〉 of a game v ∈ GN and a communication graph L on N composes a game with
cooperation structure or, in other terms, a game with graph structure, or simply a
graph game or G-game. The set of all games endowed with a graph structure on
a fixed player set N we denote GLN . Under a G-value we understand an operator
ξ : GLN → IRn that assigns to a G-game 〈v, L〉 ∈ GLN a vector of payoffs ξ(v, L) ∈ IRn.
For any graph L on N and any coalition S ⊆ N , the subgraph of L on S is the
graph L|S = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ S}. A sequence of different nodes {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ N is
a path in a graph L if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L, for all h = 1, . . . , k−1. Two nodes i, j ∈ N are
connected in L if there exists a path {i1, . . . , ik} with i1 = i and ik = j. A graph is
connected if any two nodes in it are connected. Given a graph L, a coalition S ⊆ N
is said to be connected if the subgraph L|S is connected. For a given graph L and a
coalition S ⊆ N , denote by CL(S) the set of all connected subcoalitions of S. Any
coalition S ⊆ N splits by any graph L into maximally connected coalitions called
components. By S/L we denote the set of components of S and let (S/L)i be the
component of S containing player i ∈ S. Notice that S/L is a partition of S. It is
also worth to note that for any coalition structure P, the graph Lc(P) = ⋃P∈P LcP ,
splits into completely connected components P ∈ P, and N/Lc(P) = P. For a graph
game 〈v, L〉 ∈ GLN , a payoff vector x ∈ IRn is component efficient if it holds that
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x(C) = v(C), for every component C ∈ N/L. In what follows, when it is necessary
to avoid confusion and to specify explicitly the set of nodes N of the graph, instead
of L we write more precisely LN .
Following Myerson [10], we assume that for a given game with cooperation struc-
ture 〈v, L〉, cooperation is possible only among connected players and consider a
restricted game vL ∈ GN defined as
vL(S) =
∑
C∈S/L
v(C), for all S ⊆ N.
The core C(v, L) of a graph game 〈v, L〉 is defined as a set of component efficient
payoff vectors that are not dominated by any connected coalition, i.e.,
C(v, L)={x ∈ IRn |x(C)=v(C), ∀C∈N/L, and x(T )≥v(T ), ∀T ∈CL(N)}.
It is easy to see that the core of a graph game 〈v, L〉 coincides with the core of the
restricted game vL, i.e., C(v, L) = C(vL).
Later on along with cooperation structures presented by means of general undi-
rected graphs we consider also cooperation structures given by cycle-free undirected
graphs and by directed line-graphs with linearly ordered players. Hence, a few extra
definitions. An undirected graph L is cycle-free if it contains no cycles. A sequence
of nodes {i1, . . . , ik+1} ⊆ N presents a cycle in L if (i) k ≥ 2, (ii) ih 6= il, for all
h, l = 1, . . . , k+ 1, h 6= l, (iii) ik+1 = i1, and (iv) {ih, ih+1} ∈ L, for all h = 1, . . . , k.
An undirected cycle-free connected graph is called a tree. In a directed graph L
we say that j 6= i is a subordinate of i, if there is a sequence of directed links
(ih, ih+1) ∈ L, h = 1, . . . , k, such that i1 = i and ik+1 = j. In a directed link (i, j),
j is a successor of i and i is a predecessor of j. A directed graph L is a rooted tree
if there is one node in N , called a root, having no predecessors in L and there is a
unique sequence of directed links in L from this node to any other node in N . A
line-graph is a directed graph that contains links only between subsequent nodes.
Without loss of generality we may assume that in a line-graph L nodes are ordered
according to the natural order from 1 to n, i.e., L ⊆ {(i, i+ 1) | i = 1, . . . , n− 1}.
In what follows for the cardinality of a given set A we also use a standard notation
|A| along with lower case letters like n = |N |, m = |M |, nk = |Nk| and so on.
3 Graph games with coalition structure
3.1 The model
The goal of the paper is to consider games with both coalition and cooperation
structures when a cooperation structure is specified by a two-level graph structure.
It is assumed that cooperation (via bilateral agreements between participants) is
possible only either among the entire a priori unions of the coalition structure or
among single players within a priori unions. No cooperation is allowed between
single players from distinct elements of the coalition structure. Negotiations on
the upper level between a priori unions are based only on cumulative interests of
all members of entire a priori unions involved and nobody’s personal interests are
taken directly into account.
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The combination of a TU game with a coalition structure and with limited coop-
eration possibilities presented via a two-level graph structure that in turn depends
on the given coalition structure, results in a so-called graph game with coalition
structure (PG-game), given by a tuple 〈v,P, 〈LM , {LNk}k∈M 〉〉. For simplicity of
notation and when it causes no ambiguity, we denote graphs LNk within a priori
unions Nk, k ∈ M , by Lk, a graph structure by 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 or even simply by
LP , and for a PG-game write 〈v,P, LP〉. In what follows the set of all PG-games
〈v,P, LP〉 with v ∈ GN we denote GPLN .
It is worth to emphasize that in the model under scrutiny the primary is a coali-
tion structure and a cooperation structure is introduced above the given coalition
structure. The graph structure LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 is specified by means of graphs
of two types – a graph LM connecting a priori unions as single elements, and graphs
Lk within a priori unions Nk, k ∈M , connecting single players. Fig. 1(a) illustrates
one of the possible situations within the model.
This model differs essentially from the model of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado,
and Carreras [14]. In their model, a coalition structure and a cooperation structure
are independent of each other, moreover, a communication graph specifying the
cooperation structure connects only single players. Fig. 1(b) provides an example
of the possible situation within the model of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado, and
Carreras with the same set of players, the same coalition structure, and even the
same links connecting players within a priori unions, as in the previous example on
Fig. 1(a). Generally, the newly introduced model with coalition and two-level coop-
eration structures cannot be reduced to the model of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado,
and Carreras. Indeed, consider for example negotiations between two countries held
on the level of prime ministers who in turn are citizens of their countries. The com-
munication link between countries in this case cannot be replaced by either commun-
a) b) c)
Fig. 1
a) model of the paper; b) model of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado, and Carreras;
c) case of the coincidence of both models
ication link connecting the prime ministers as single persons and therefore presenting
only their personal interests, or all communication links connecting all citizens of
one country with all citizens of another country and also presenting links only on
the personal level. The only situation when these two models coincide is the case
when a graph LM presenting a cooperation structure between a priori unions in
our model is empty and components of the communication graph L in the model
of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado, and Carreras are subsets of the given a priori
unions, i.e., C ⊆ Nk ∈ P, for all C ∈ N/L. In such a case a communication graph in
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the model of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado, and Carreras coincides with the union
of all communication graphs within a priori unions in our model, i.e., L =
⋃
k∈M Lk.
An example illustrating this situation with the same player set, the same coalition
structure, and the same communication graphs within a priori unions, as on Fig. 1(a)
is given on Fig. 1(c).
We define a PG-value as an operator ξ : GPLN → IRn that assigns to a game
v ∈ GN endowed with a coalition structure P and a graph structure LP dependent
on P, a vector of payoffs ξ(v,P, LP) ∈ IRn.
Remark 3.1 Notice that a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 can be considered, in particular, with
the trivial coalition structure P, i.e., when P = 〈N〉 or P = {N}. If P = 〈N〉, it
holds that M = N , LM = LN , and all graphs Lk = ∅, k ∈M , else if P = {N} then
M is singleton, LM = ∅, and L1 = LN . Thus, both PG-games 〈v, 〈N〉, L〈N〉〉 and
〈v, {N}, L{N}〉 reduces to a G-game 〈v, LN 〉.
For a given PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉, LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉, one can consider graph
games within a priori unions 〈vk, Lk〉, vk = v|Nk , k ∈M . Moreover, given a coalition
structure one can consider a quotient game. However, a quotient game considered
with respect to a PG-game should take into account a limited cooperation within
a priori unions, and thus it differs from the classical one of Owen. For a given
PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉, LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉, we define the quotient game vPL as
vPL(Q) =

vLkk (Nk), Q = {k},
v(
⋃
k∈Q
Nk), |Q| > 1, for all Q ⊆M.
Next, one can consider naturally a graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉.
Furthermore, for a given G-value ξ, for any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 with a graph
structure LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 suitable for application of ξ to the corresponding
graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉1, along with a subgame vk within a priori union Nk,
k ∈M , one can also consider a ξk-game vξk defined as
vξk(S) =
{
ξk(vPL, LM ), S = Nk,
v(S), S 6= Nk, for all S ⊆ Nk,
where ξk(vPL, LM) is the payoff to the unionNk in the graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM〉
with respect to G-value ξ. In particular, for any x ∈ IRm, a xk-game vxk within Nk,
k ∈MP , is defined by
vxk(S) =
{
xk, S = Nk,
v(S), S 6= Nk, for all S ⊆ Nk.
In this context it is natural to consider graph games 〈vξk, Lk〉, k ∈M , as well.
3.2 The core
Following the same approach as for games with cooperation structure, the core
C(v,P, LP) of a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉, LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉, is defined as a set of
payoff vectors that are
1Some G-values can be applied not to all G-games but only to G-games determined by graphs
of certain types such as cycle-free graphs, line-graphs, etc.; for more detailed discussion see Sect. 4.
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(i) component efficient both in the graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉 and in all
graph games within a priori unions 〈vk, Lk〉, k ∈M , containing more than one
player,
(ii) not dominated by any connected coalition:
C(v,P, LP) =
{
x ∈ IRn |
[[
xP(K) = vPL(K), ∀K ∈M/LM
]
&[
xP(Q) ≥ vPL(Q), ∀Q ∈ CLM (M)
]]
& (1)[[
x(C)=v(C), ∀C∈Nk/Lk, C 6=Nk
]
&
[
x(S)≥v(S),∀S∈CLk(Nk)
]
,∀k∈M : nk>1
]}
.
Remark 3.2 Notice that in the above definition of the core of a PG-game the con-
dition of component efficiency on components equal to the entire a priori unions at
the level within a priori unions is excluded. The reason is the following. By the def-
inition of the quotient game, for any k ∈ M , vPL({k}) = vLkk (Nk). If Nk ∈ Nk/Lk,
i.e., if Lk is connected, v
Lk
k (Nk) = v(Nk) and therefore vPL({k}) = v(Nk). Besides
by definition, xP({k}) = xPk = x(Nk), for all k ∈ M . Furthermore, singleton coali-
tions are always connected, i.e., {k} ∈ CLM (M), for all k ∈M . Thus, in case when
Nk ∈ Nk/Lk, the presence of a stronger condition x(Nk) = v(Nk) at the level within
a priori unions may conflict with a weaker condition xP({k}) ≥ vPL({k}), which in
this situation is the same as x(Nk) ≥ v(Nk), at the quotient level, that as a result
can lead to the emptiness of the core.
The next statement easily follows from the above definition.
Proposition 1 A payoff vector x ∈ IRn belongs to the core C(v,P, LP) of a GC-ga-
me 〈v,P, LP〉, LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉, if and only if xP belongs to the core C(vPL, LM ),
and for all k ∈M such that nk > 1, xNk belongs to the core C(vx
P
k , Lk) i.e.,
x ∈ C(v,P, LP) ⇐⇒
[
xP ∈ C(vPL, LM )
]
&
[
xNk ∈ C(vx
P
k , Lk),∀k ∈M : nk>1
]
.
Remark 3.3 It worth to mention that the claim xNk ∈ C(vx
P
k , Lk), k ∈ M , is vital
only if Nk ∈ Nk/Lk, i.e., if Lk is connected; in case when Nk /∈ Nk/Lk, i.e., Lk is
not connected, it can be replaced by xNk ∈ C(vk, Lk) as well.
4 Component efficient G-values
Before turning to the discussion over PG-values for graph games with coalition
structure we review first several known component efficient G-values for graph games
and show that they may be approached within a unique framework.
A G-value ξ is component efficient (CE) if, for any graph game 〈v, L〉, for all
C ∈ N/L, ∑
i∈C
ξi(v, L) = v(C).
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4.1 The Myerson value
For arbitrary undirected graphs the Myerson value [10] of any graph game 〈v, L〉
coincides with the Shapley value for the restricted game vL, i.e.,
µi(v, L) = Shi(vL), for all i ∈ N.
It is characterized by two axioms of component efficiency and fairness.
A G-value ξ is fair (F) if, for any graph game 〈v, L〉, for every link {i, j} ∈ L,
ξi(v, L)− ξi(v, L\{i, j}) = ξj(v, L)− ξj(v, L\{i, j}).
4.2 The position value
For arbitrary undirected graphs the position value, introduced in Meessen [9] and
developed in Borm, Owen, and Tijs [3], attributes to each player in a graph game
〈v, L〉 the sum of his individual value v(i) and half of the value of each link he is
involved in, where the value of a link is defined as the Shapley payoff to this link in
the associated link game on links of L. More precisely,
pii(v, L) = v(i) +
1
2
∑
l∈Li
Shl(L, v0L), for all i ∈ N,
where Li = {l ∈ L|l 3 i}, v0 is the zero-normalization of v, i.e., for all S ⊆ N ,
v0(S) = v(S) −∑i∈S v(i), and for any zero-normalized game v ∈ GN and a graph
L, the associated link game 〈L, vL〉 between links in L is defined as
vL(L′) = vL
′
(N), for all L′ ∈ 2L.
Slikker [13] characterizes the position value on the class of all graph games via
component efficiency and balanced link contributions.
A G-value ξ satisfies balanced link contributions (BLC) if, for any graph game
〈v, L〉, for any i, j ∈ N ,∑
h|{i,h}∈L
[
ξj(v, L)− ξj(v, L\{i, h})
]
=
∑
h|{j,h}∈L
[
ξi(v, L)− ξi(v, L\{j, h})
]
.
4.3 The average tree solution
A new interesting and algorithmically very attractive2 solution concept for cycle-
free graph games, the so called average tree solution (AT-solution), is introduced in
Herings, Laan, and Talman [7]. Recall the definition. Consider a cycle-free graph
game 〈v, L〉 and let i ∈ N . Then i belongs to the component (N/L)i and induces a
unique rooted tree T (i) on (N/L)i in the following way. For every j ∈ (N/L)i\{i},
there is a unique path in the subgraph 〈(N/L)i, L|(N/L)i〉 from i to j. That allows to
change undirected links on this path to directed so that the first node in any ordered
pair is the node coming first on the path from i to j. The payoff tij(v, L) associated
in the tree T (i) to any player j ∈ (N/L)i (obviously, in this case (N/L)j = (N/L)i)
2In comparison with the Myerson value (the Shapley value) with computational complexity of
the order n!, the AT-solution has the computational complexity of the order n.
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is equal to the worth of the coalition composed of player j and all his subordinates
in T (i) minus the sum of the worths of all coalitions composed of any successor of
player j and all subordinates of this successor in T (i), i.e.,
tij(v, L) = v(S¯T (i)(j))−
∑
h∈FT (i)(j)
v(S¯T (i)(h)), for all j ∈ (N/L)i,
where for any node j ∈ (N/L)i, FT (i)(j) = {h ∈ (N/L)i | (j, h) ∈ T (i)} is the
set of all successors of j in T (i), ST (i)(j) is the set of all subordinates of j in
T (i), and S¯T (i)(j) = ST (i)(j) ∪ j. Every component C ∈ N/L in the cycle-free
graph L induces |C| different trees, one tree for each one of different nodes. The
average tree solution assigns to each cycle-free graph game 〈v, L〉 the payoff vector
in which player j ∈ N receives the average over i ∈ (N/L)j of the payoffs tij(v, L),
i.e.,
ATj(v, L) =
1
|(N/L)j |
∑
i∈(N/L)j
tij(v, L), for all j ∈ N.
The average tree solution defined on the class of cycle-free graph games appears to
be stable and is characterized via two axioms of component efficiency and component
fairness.
A G-value ξ is component fair (CF) if, for any cycle-free graph game 〈v, L〉, for
every link {i, j} ∈ L,
1
|(N/L\{i, j})i|
∑
t∈(N/L\{i,j})i
(
ξt(v, L)− ξt(v, L\{i, j}
)
=
1
|(N/L\{i, j})j |
∑
t∈(N/L\{i,j})j
(
ξt(v, L)− ξt(v, L\{i, j}
)
.
4.4 Values for line-graph games
Different values for games with cooperation structure presented by line-graphs are
studied in Brink, Laan, and Vasil’ev [4]. Along with the Myerson value for a graph
game 〈v, L〉 with line-graph  L the authors consider three other solution concepts,
namely, the upper equivalent solution given by
ξUEi (v, L) = m
u
i (v
L), for all i ∈ N,
the lower equivalent solution given by
ξLEi (v, L) = m
l
i(v
L), for all i ∈ N,
and the equal loss solution given by
ξELi (v, L) =
mui (v
L) +mli(v
L)
2
, for all i ∈ N.
The last three solutions for line-graph games turn out to be stable and are charac-
terized via component efficiency and one of the three following axioms expressing
different fairness properties respectively.
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A G-value ξ is upper equivalent (UE) if, for any line-graph game 〈v, L〉, for any
i = 1, . . . , n− 1, for all j = 1, . . . , i,
ξj(v, L\{i, i+1}) = ξj(v, L).
A G-value ξ is lower equivalent (LE) if, for any line-graph game 〈v, L〉, for any
i = 1, . . . , n− 1, for all j = i+ 1, . . . , n,
ξj(v, L\{i, i+1}) = ξj(v, L).
A G-value ξ possesses the equal loss property (EL) if, for any line-graph game
〈v, L〉, for any i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
i∑
j=1
(
ξj(v, L)− ξj(v, L\{i, i+1})
)
=
n∑
j=i+1
(
ξj(v, L)− ξj(v, L\{i, i+1})
)
.
4.5 Uniform approach to component efficient G-values
Notice that each of the discussed above G-values for graph games with suitable
graph structure is characterized by means of two axioms, component efficiency and
one or another deletion link property (DL), reflecting the relevant reaction of the
considered G-value on the deletion of a link in the communication graph, i.e.,
CE + F for all G-games ⇐⇒ µ(v, L) = Sh(vL),
CE + BLC for all G-games ⇐⇒ pi(v, L),
CE + CF for cycle-free G-games ⇐⇒ AT (v, L),
CE + UE for line G-games ⇐⇒ mu(vL),
CE + LE for line G-games ⇐⇒ ml(vL),
CE + EL for line G-games ⇐⇒ m
u(vL) +ml(vL)
2
.
In the sequel, for unification of presentation and for simplicity of notation we identify
each one of these G-values with the corresponding deletion link axiom. Let for a
given deletion link axiom DL, GDLN ⊆ GLN be a set of all G-games 〈v, L〉 such that
the graph structure L is suitable for application of DL. To summarize the above
scheme, we can state that
CE + DL on GDLN ⇐⇒ DL(v, L),
where DL is one of the axioms F, BLC, CF, LE, UE, or EL.
Thus, under F -value we understand the Myerson value, i.e., F (v, L) = µ(v, L),
for all G-games; under BLC-value – the position value, i.e., BLC(v, L) = pi(v, L),
for all G-games; under CF -value – the average tree solution, i.e., CF (v, L) =
AT (v, L), for cycle-free G-games; under LE-value – the lower equivalent solu-
tion, i.e., LE(v, L) = ml(vL), for line G-games; under UE-value – the upper
equivalent solution, i.e., UE(v, L) = mu(vL), for line G-games; and under EL-
value – the equal loss solution equal to the average of LE- and UE-values, i.e.,
EL(v, L) =
mu(vL) +ml(vL)
2
, for line G-games.
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5 PG-values
5.1 Component efficient PG-values
We adapt now the notions of component efficiency and discussed above different
deletion link properties to PG-values and show that similar to component efficient
G-values, the deletion link properties uniquely define component efficient PG-values
on a class of PG-games with suitable graph structure. The involvement of several
distinct deletion link properties not only enriches the solution concept of a PG-value.
In many cases depending on the considered graph structure it also provides a choice
of a more efficient computational algorithm.
Introduce first two new axioms of component efficiency with respect to PG-
values that inherit the idea of component efficiency of G-values for games with graph
structure and also incorporate the quotient game property3 of the Owen value [11]
in a sense that the vector of total payoffs to a priori unions is at the same time a
payoff vector in the quotient game.
A PG-value ξ is component efficient in the quotient (CEQ) if, for any PG-game
〈v,P, LP〉, LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉, for each K ∈M/LM ,∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) = vPL(K).
A PG-value ξ is component efficient within a priori unions (CEU) if, for any PG-
game 〈v,P, LP〉, LP=〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉, for every k∈M and all C∈Nk/Lk, C 6=Nk,∑
i∈C
ξi(v,P, LP) = v(C).
Reconsider next the deletion link properties, now with respect to PG-games.
Observe that every PG-value is an operator ξ : GPLN → IRn. An operator ξ = {ξi}i∈N
generates on the domain of PG-games an operator ξP : GPLN → IRm, ξP = {ξPk }k∈M ,
with ξPk =
∑
i∈Nk ξi, k ∈M , and m operators ξNk : GPLN → IRnk , ξNk = {ξi}i∈Nk , k ∈
M . Then, since there are many PG-games 〈v,P, LP〉 with the same graph quotient
game 〈vPL, LM 〉, there exists a variety of operators ψP : GLM → GPLN assigning to
a G-game 〈u, L〉 ∈ GLM , a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ GPLN , such that vPL = u and
LM = L. In general, it is not necessarily that ψP(vPL, LM ) = 〈v,P, LP〉, however,
for some fixed PG-game 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉 one can always choose an operator ψ∗P such that
ψ∗P(v
∗
PL, L
∗
M ) = 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉. Any operator ξP◦ψP : GLM → IRm, presents a G-value
that, in particular, can be applied to the graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉 ∈ GLM
of some PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ GPLN . Similarly, for a given G-value φ, for every
k ∈ M , there exists a variety of operators ψφk : GLNk → GPLN assigning to a G-game
〈u, L〉 ∈ GLNk , a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ GPLN , such that v
φ
k = u and Lk = L. For every
k ∈ M , an operator ξNk ◦ ψφk : GLNk → IRnk presents a G-value that, in particular,
can be applied to graph φk-games within a priori unions 〈vφk , Lk〉 ∈ GLNk relevant to
3A P-value ξ satisfies the quotient game property (QGP) if, for any game with coalition structure
〈v,P〉, for all k ∈M ,
ξk(vP , {M}) = ξk(vP , 〈M〉) =
∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P).
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some PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ GPLN . For a given (m + 1)-tuple of deletion link ax-
ioms 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉 consider a set of PG-games GDL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N ⊆ GPLN com-
posed of PG-games 〈v,P, LP〉 with graph structures LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 such
that 〈vPL, LM 〉 ∈ GDLPM , and 〈vDL
P
k , Lk〉 ∈ GDL
k
M , k ∈M .
A PG-value ξ defined on GDLP ,{DLk}k∈MN satisfies (m+1)-tuple of deletion link ax-
ioms 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉, if the corresponding G-values ξP◦ψP satisfy axiom DLP and
for all k∈M , the corresponding G-values ξNk◦ψDL
P
k satisfy axiom DL
k respectively.
Our goal is to focus on PG-values that reflect a two-stage distribution procedure
when at first it is played a graph quotient game 〈vPL,LM〉 between a priori unions,
and then the total payoff yk, k ∈M , obtained by Nk is distributed among its mem-
bers by playing the graph yk-game 〈vyk, Lk〉. To ensure that benefits of cooperation
between a priori unions can be fully distributed among single players, or in other
words, the total payoff of any a priori union is equal to the payoff of the a priori
union in the quotient game, we assume that the solutions in all graph yk-games
〈vyk, Lk〉, k ∈M , are efficient. Since we concentrate on component efficient solutions,
it is important to ensure that the requirement of efficiency does not conflict with
component efficiency, which results in the claim that for every k ∈M ,∑
C∈Nk/Lk
vyk(C) = yk.
If the graph Lk is connected, i.e. if Nk is the only element of Nk/Lk, then the last
equality holds automatically since by definition vyk(Nk) = yk. Otherwise, for every
k ∈M such that Lk is disconnected, it is necessary to require that∑
C∈Nk/Lk
v(C) = yk. (2)
We say that in a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 the graph structure within a priori unions
{Lk}k∈M is compatible with a payoff vector y ∈ IRm in the graph quotient game
〈vPL, LM 〉, if for every k ∈M , either the graph Lk is connected, or holds equality (2).
For applications involving disconnected graphs Lk, the requirement of compatibil-
ity (2) appears to be too demanding. However, it is worth to stress the following.
Remark 5.1 If all graphs Lk, k ∈M , are connected, then the graph structure within
a priori unions {Lk}k∈M is always compatible with any payoff vector y ∈ IRm in
〈vPL, LM 〉, and efficiency follows from component efficiency automatically.
Denote by G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN the set of PG-games composed of PG-games 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈
GDLP ,{DLk}k∈MN with graph structures within a priori unions {Lk}k∈M compatible
with the payoff vector DLP(vPL, LM ) in the graph quotient game.
Theorem 1 There is a unique PG-value defined on G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN that satisfies
axioms CEQ, CEU, and 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉, and for any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈
G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN it is given by
ξi(v,P, LP) =
 DL
P
k(i)(vPL, LM ), Nk(i) = {i},
DL
k(i)
i (v
DLP
k(i) , Lk(i)), nk(i) > 1,
for all i ∈ N. (3)
From now on we refer to the PG-value ξ as to the 〈DLP, {DLk}k∈M 〉-value.
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Proof.
I. We prove first that the PG-value ξ given by (3) is the unique PG-value on
G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN that meets all axioms CEQ, CEU, and 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉. Let a
PG-game 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N , L
∗
P = 〈L∗M , {L∗k}k∈M 〉, and let v∗PL be
its quotient game. Notice that by choice of 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉, 〈v∗PL, L∗M 〉 ∈ GDL
P
M and
〈(v∗)DLPk , L∗k〉 ∈ GDL
k
Nk
, for all k ∈M .
Step 1. Level of a priori unions.
Consider an operator ψ∗P : GDL
P
M → G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N that assigns to any G-game
〈u, L〉 ∈ GDLPM , a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N , such that vPL = u and
LM = L, and satisfies the condition ψ∗P(v
∗
PL, L
∗
M ) = 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉. For any G-game
〈u, L〉 ∈ GDLPM and for 〈v,P, LP〉 = ψ∗P(u, L), by definition of ξP ,
(ξP ◦ ψ∗P)k(u, L) =
∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP), for all k ∈M. (4)
Since ξ meets CEQ, for any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉∈G¯DL
P,{DLk}k∈M
N , for all K∈M/LM ,∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) = vPL(K).
Combining the last two equalities and taking into account that by definition of ψ∗P ,
vPL=u and LM =L, we get that for any G-game 〈u, L〉∈GDLPM , for every K∈M/L,∑
k∈K
(ξP ◦ ψ∗P)k(u, L) = u(K),
i.e., the G-value ξP◦ψ∗P on GDL
P
M satisfies CE. Then, due to the characterization re-
sults for G-values discussed above in Sect. 4, axioms CE and DLP together guarantee
that for any 〈u, L〉 ∈ GDLPM ,
(ξP ◦ ψ∗P)k(u, L) = DLPk (u, L), for all k ∈M.
In particular, the last equality is valid for 〈u, L〉 = 〈v∗PL, L∗M 〉 ∈ GDL
P
M , i.e.,
(ξP ◦ ψ∗P)k(v∗PL, L∗M ) = DLPk (v∗PL, L∗M ), for all k ∈M.
Wherefrom, because of (4) and by choice of ψ∗P ,∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v∗,P∗, L∗P) = DLPk (v∗PL, L∗M ), for all k ∈M.
Thus, because of the arbitrary choice of the PG-game 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉, it holds that for
any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N ,∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) = DLPk (vPL, LM ), for all k ∈M. (5)
Notice that for k ∈M such that Nk = {i}, equality (5) reduces to
ξi(v,P, LP) = DLPk(i)(vPL, LM ), for all i ∈ N s.t. Nk(i) = {i}. (6)
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Step 2. Level of single players within a priori unions.
Consider now k′∈M for which nk′>1. Let an operator ψ∗k′ :GDL
k′
Nk′
→G¯DLP,{DLk}k∈MN
assign to a G-game 〈u, L〉∈GDLk′Nk′ , a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉∈G¯
DLP,{DLk}k∈M
N , such that
vDL
P
k′ =u and Lk′=L, and meet the condition ψ
∗
k′((v
∗)DL
P
k′ , L
∗
k′)=〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉. Then
by definition of ξNk′ , for any G-game 〈u, L〉 ∈ GDL
k′
Nk′
and for 〈v,P, LP〉 = ψ∗k′(u, L),
(ξNk′ ◦ ψ∗k′)i(u, L) = ξi(v,P, LP), for all i ∈ Nk′ . (7)
Since the PG-value ξ meets CEU, for any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉∈G¯DL
P,{DLk}k∈M
N , for
every C ∈ Nk′/Lk′ , C 6= Nk′ , ∑
i∈C
ξi(v,P, LP) = v(C).
From (5), in particular, it follows that for any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N ,
such that Nk′ ∈ Nk′/Lk′ ,∑
i∈Nk′
ξi(v,P, LP) = DLPk′(vPL, LM ).
Combining the last two equalities with (7) and recalling that by definition of ψ∗k′ ,
vDL
P
k′ =u and Lk′=L, and therefore for any C∈Nk′/L, C 6=Nk′ , v(C)=v|NK′ (C)=
vDL
P
k′ (C)=u(C), we obtain that for any G-game 〈u, L〉∈GDL
k′
Nk′
, for every C∈Nk′/L,∑
i∈C
(ξNk′ ◦ ψ∗k′)i(u, L) =
{
DLPk′(vPL, LM ), C = Nk′ ,
u(C), C 6= Nk′ ,
with 〈vPL, LM 〉 being the graph quotient game relevant to 〈v,P, LP〉 = ψ∗k′(u, L).
Thus, the G-value ξNk′ ◦ ψ∗k′ meets CE on a set of G-games
GDLk
′
Nk′ (DL
P
k′) =
{〈u, L〉 ∈ GDLk′Nk′ |u(Nk′)=DLPk′(vPL, LM ) for 〈v,P, LP〉=ψ∗k′(u, L)}.
CE together with DLk
′
guarantee that for any G-game 〈u, L〉 ∈ GDLk′Nk′ (DL
P
k′),
(ξNk′ ◦ ψ∗k′)i(u, L) = DLk
′
i (u, L), for all i ∈ Nk′ .
Observe that by choice of ψ∗k′ , 〈(v∗)DL
P
k′ , L
∗
k′〉 ∈ GDL
k′
Nk′
(DLPk′). Hence, in particular,
the last equality holds on the G-game 〈(v∗)DLPk′ , L∗k′〉, i.e.,
(ξNk′ ◦ ψ∗k′)i((v∗)DL
P
k′ , L
∗
k′) = DL
k′
i ((v
∗)DL
P
k′ , L
∗
k′), for all i ∈ Nk′ .
Wherefrom since (7) and by choice of ψ∗k′ we obtain that
ξi(v∗,P∗, L∗P) = DLk
′
i ((v
∗)DL
P
k′ , L
∗
k′), for all i ∈ Nk′ .
Because of the arbitrary choice of the PG-game 〈v∗,P∗, L∗P〉 and k′ ∈ M for which
nk′ > 1, it holds that for any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N ,
ξi(v,P, LP) = DLk(i)i (vDL
P
k(i) , Lk(i)), for all i ∈ N s.t. nk(i) > 1. (8)
Observe that the proof of equality (8) is based on equality (5) only when Nk ∈
Nk/Lk, but (5) holds for all Nk, k ∈M . To exclude any conflict, we show now that
on G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN , (8) agrees with (5), when Nk /∈ Nk/Lk, as well. Let a PG-game
15
〈v,P, LP〉∈G¯DL
P,{DLk}k∈M
N be such that for some k
′′∈M , nk′′>1 andNk′′ /∈Nk′′/Lk′′ .
Then,∑
i∈Nk′′
ξi(v,P, LP) =
∑
C∈Nk′′/Lk′′
∑
i∈C
ξi(v,P, LP) (8)=
∑
C∈Nk′′/Lk′′
∑
i∈C
DLk
′′
i (v
DLP
k′′ , Lk′′).
Whence, due to component efficiency of DLk
′′
-value and since, for any C $ Nk′′ ,
vDL
P
k′′ (C) = vk′′(C) = v|Nk′′ (C) = v(C), we obtain∑
i∈Nk′′
ξi(v,P, LP) =
∑
C∈Nk′′/Lk′′
v(C).
By definition of G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN , the graph structure within a priori unions {Lk}k∈M
in 〈v,P, LP〉 is compatible with DLP(vPL, LM ), which means that∑
C∈Nk/Lk
v(C) = DLPk (vPL, LM ), for all k ∈M : Nk /∈ Nk/Lk. (9)
Combining the last two equalities we obtain that (5) holds for k′′ as well.
Notice now that (6) and (8) together produce formula (3).
II. To complete the proof we verify that the PG-value ξ on G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN given
by (3) meets all axioms CEQ, CEU, and 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉. Consider arbitrary
〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N . To simplify discussion and w.l.o.g. we assume that for
all k ∈M , nk > 1. Let k ∈M and let C ∈ Nk/Lk. Because of component efficiency
of DLk-value, from (3) it follows that∑
i∈C
ξi(v,P, LP) = vDLPk (C). (10)
If C 6= Nk, then vDLPk (C) = vk(C) = v|Nk(C) = v(C). Hence, due to arbitrary
choice of k, ξ satisfies CEU. Moreover, from (10) and by definition of DLPk -game
vDL
P
k , it also follows that∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) = DLPk (vPL, LM ), for all k ∈M : Nk ∈ Nk/Lk.
Observe now that on G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN , due to validity of equality (9), just proved CEU
provides that for all k ∈M , for which Nk /∈ Nk/Lk, the last equality holds as well:∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) =
∑
C∈Nk/Lk
∑
i∈C
ξi(v,P, LP) CEU=
∑
C∈Nk/Lk
v(C)
(9)
= DLPk (vPL, LM ).
Thus, ∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) = DLPk (vPL, LM ), for all k ∈M. (11)
Consider now K ∈M/LM .∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) (11)=
∑
k∈K
DLPk (vPL, LM ).
Whence and due to component efficiency ofDLP -value, we obtain that ξ meets CEQ.
Next, let an operator ψP : GDLPM → G¯DL
P,{DLk}k∈M
N assign to any G-game 〈u, L〉 ∈
GDLPM , a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉∈G¯DL
P,{DLk}k∈M
N , such that vPL=u and LM =L. Then,
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for any G-game 〈u, L〉 ∈ GDLPM and for 〈v,P, LP〉 = ψ∗P(u, L), because of definition
of ξP and equality (11), it holds
(ξP◦ψP)k(u, L)=ξPk (v,P, LP)=
∑
i∈Nk
ξi(v,P, LP) (11)= DLPk (vPL, LM ), for all k ∈M.
Hence, due to the choice of ψP , (ξP ◦ ψP)(u, L) = DLP(u, L), i.e., G-value ξP ◦ ψP
meets DLP . Similarly we can show that the corresponding G-values ξNk ◦ ψDL
P
k ,
k ∈M , satisfy axioms DLk respectively.
A simple algorithm to compute the 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-value of a PG-game
〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N follows from Theorem 1:
- compute the DLP -value of the graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉;
- distribute the rewards DLPk (vPL, LM ), k ∈M , of a priori unions among single
players within each union by means of the corresponding DLk-values applied
respectively to the graph DLPk -games 〈vDL
P
k , Lk〉 within the a priori unions.
Example 5.1 Consider a numerical example for the 〈LE,CF, . . . , CF︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〉-value ξ of
a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 with cooperation structure LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 given by
line-graph LM and undirected trees Lk, k ∈ M . As we will see below in Sect. 7,
the 〈LE,CF, . . . , CF︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〉-value provides a reasonable solution of the river game with
multiple users.
Assume that N contains 6 players, the game v is defined as follows:
v({i}) = 0, for all i ∈ N ;
v({2, 3}) = 1, v({4, 5}) = v({4, 6}) = 2.8, v({5, 6}) = 2.9,
otherwise v({i, j}) = 0, for all i, j∈N ;
v({1, 2, 3}) = 2, v({1, 2, 3, i}) = 3, for i=4, 5, 6; otherwise v(S) = |S|, if |S| ≥ 3;
and the coalition and cooperation structures, respectively, are given by Fig. 2.
N1 N2 N3
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 2
In this case N = N1 ∪N2 ∪N3;
N1={1}, N2={2, 3}, N3={4, 5, 6}; L1=∅, L2={{2, 3}}, L3={{4, 5}, {5, 6}};
M = {1, 2, 3}; LM = {(1, 2), (2, 3)};
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the quotient game vPL is given by
vPL({1}) = 0, vPL({2}) = 1, vPL({3}) = 3,
vPL({1, 2}) = 2, vPL({2, 3}) = 5, vPL({1, 3}) = 4, vPL({1, 2, 3}) = 6;
the restricted quotient game vLMPL is
vLMPL ({1}) = 0, vLMPL ({2}) = 1, vLMPL ({3}) = 3,
vLMPL ({1, 2}) = 2, vLMPL ({2, 3}) = 5, vLMPL ({1, 3}) = vLMPL ({1}) + vLMPL ({3}) = 3,
vLMPL ({1, 2, 3}) = 6;
the games vk, k = 1, 2, 3, within a priori unions Nk are given respectively by
v1({1}) = 0;
v2({2}) = v2({3}) = 0, v2({2, 3}) = 1;
v3({4})=v3({5})=v3({6})=0, v3({4, 5})=v3({4, 6})=2.8, v3({5, 6})=2.9,
v3({4, 5, 6}) = 3;
and the restricted games vLkk , k = 1, 2, 3, within a priori unions Nk are
vL11 ({1}) = 0;
vL22 ({2}) = vL22 ({3}) = 0, vL22 ({2, 3}) = 1;
vL33 ({4})=vL33 ({5})=vL33 ({6})=0, vL33 ({4, 5})=2.8, vL33 ({4, 6})=0,
vL33 ({5, 6})=2.9, vL33 ({4, 5, 6}) = 3.
Due to the above algorithm, the PG-value ξ can be obtained by finding of the lower
equivalent solution in the line-graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉 and thereafter the
total payoffs to the a priori unions LEk(vPL, LM ), k ∈ M , should be distributed
according to the average-tree solution applied to cycle-free graph LE-games within
a priori unions, i.e., for all i ∈ N , ξi(v,P, LP) = AT i(vLEk(i), Lk(i)). Simple computa-
tions show that
LE1(vPL, LM )=vLMPL ({1, 2, 3})− vLMPL ({2, 3})=1,
LE2(vPL, LM )=vLMPL ({2, 3})− vLMPL ({3})=2,
LE3(vPL, LM )=vLMPL ({3})=3;
AT1(vLE1 , L1)=LE1=1,
AT2(vLE2 , L2)=[[LE2−v2({3})]+v2({2})]/2=(2+0)/2=1,
AT3(vLE2 , L2)=[v2({3})+[LE2−v2({2})]]/2=(0+2)/2=1,
AT4(vLE3 , L3)=[[LE3−v3({5, 6})]+v3({4})+v3({4})]/3=
=[(3−2.9)+0+0]/3= 1
30
,
AT5(vLE3 , L3)=[[v3({5, 6})−v3({6})]+[LE3−v3({4})−v3({6})]+
+[v3({4, 5})−v3({4})]]/3=(2.9+3+2.8)/3=22730 ,
AT6(vLE3 , L3)=[v3({6})+v3({6})+[LE3−v3({4, 5})]]/3=
=[0+0+(3− 2.8)]/3= 2
30
.
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Thus, ξ(v,P, LP) = (1, 1, 1, 130 , 2
27
30
,
2
30
).
It was already mentioned in Remark 3.1 that PG-games 〈v, 〈N〉, L〈N〉〉 and
〈v, {N}, L{N}〉 reduce to the G-game 〈v, LN 〉. Whence, any 〈F, {DLk}k∈N 〉-value
of a PG-game 〈v, 〈N〉, L〈N〉〉 and any 〈DL,F 〉-value of a PG-game 〈v, {N}, L{N}〉
coincide with the Myerson value of the G-game 〈v, LN 〉; moreover, if the graph LN
is complete, they coincide also with the Shapley value and the Owen value. Then
notice that in a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 with any coalition structure P and for which
the graph LM is empty and all graphs Lk, k ∈M , are complete, i.e., Lk = LcNk , any
〈DLP , F, . . . , F︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〉-value coincides with the Aumann-Dre`ze value of P-game 〈v,P〉.
However, the newly introduced 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-value of a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉
with nontrivial coalition structure P never coincides with the Owen value (and
therefore with the value of Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado, and Carreras [14] as
well) because in our model no cooperation is allowed between a proper subcoalition
of any a priori union with members of other a priori unions. On the contrary, in
the case of Owen the cooperation of a proper subcoalition of an a priori union with
other entire a priori unions is permitted, namely, the Owen value assumes that any
subcoalition of any chosen a priori union may represent this union in the negotiation
procedure with other entire a priori unions.
5.2 Stability
Theorem 2 If all DL axioms at issue are of the types CF, LE, UE, or EL, then the
〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-value of a superadditive PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N
belongs to the core, i.e., 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉(v,P, LP) ∈ C(v,P, LP).
Remark that, under the conditions of Theorem 2, all solutions at issue are combina-
tions of the average-tree solution for cycle-free graph games and the lower equivalent,
upper equivalent and equal loss solutions for line-graph games.
Proof. As it is shown in [7], the average-tree solution for superadditive cycle-free
graph games is a core selector. The similar result for the lower equivalent, upper
equivalent and equal loss solutions for superadditive line-graph games is obtained
in [4]. For a superadditive game v, the quotient game vPL and games vk, k ∈ M ,
within a priori unions are superadditive as well. Hence,
DLP(vPL, LM ) ∈ C(vPL, LM ), (12)
DLk(vk, Lk) ∈ C(vk, Lk), for all k ∈M : nk>1. (13)
Because of (12) and since any singleton coalition is always connected,
DLPk (vPL, LM ) ≥ vPL({k}) = vLkk (Nk), for all k ∈M : nk>1.
Observe that, if Nk ∈ Nk/Lk, the games vLkk and vk coincide, and therefore, because
of the last inequality, the DLPk -game v
DLP
k is superadditive as well. Thus,
DLk(vDL
P
k , Lk) ∈ C(vDL
P
k , Lk), for all k ∈M : nk>1 & Nk∈Nk/Lk.
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IfNk /∈Nk/Lk, then by definition of the core of a graph game,C(vDLPk , Lk)=C(vk,Lk),
and by definition of the average-tree solution for cycle-free graph games and the
lower equivalent, upper equivalent and equal loss solutions for line-graph games,
DLk(vDL
P
k , Lk) = DL
k(vk, Lk). Wherefrom, because of (13) and together with the
previous equality, we arrive at
DLk(vDL
P
k , Lk) ∈ C(vDL
P
k , Lk), for all k ∈M : nk>1. (14)
As it is shown in part II of the proof of Theorem 1 (equality (11)), the vector
〈DLP, {DLk}k∈M 〉P(v,P, LP) =
{∑
i∈Nk
〈DLP, {DLk}k∈M 〉i(v,P, LP)
}
k∈M
is the DLP -value for the graph quotient game 〈vPL, LM 〉, and hence, since (12),
〈DLP, {DLk}k∈M 〉P(v,P, LP) ∈ C(vPL, LM ). (15)
Further,
〈DLP, {DLk}k∈M 〉|Nk(v,P, LP)
(3)
= DLk(vDL
P
k , Lk), for all k ∈M : nk>1.
Wherefrom together with (14), we obtain that
〈DLP, {DLk}k∈M 〉|Nk(v,P, LP) ∈ C(vDL
P
k , Lk), for all k ∈M : nk>1. (16)
Since Proposition 1, equalities (15) and (16) provide that
〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉(v,P, LP) ∈ C(v,P, LP).
Return now back to Example 5.1 and notice that it illustrates also the validity
of Theorem 2. In fact, the considered 6-person game v is superadditive and the
payoff vector ξ(v,P, LP) given by the 〈LE,CF,CF,CF 〉-value ξ belongs to the
core C(v,P, LP). Moreover, the PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 of Example 5.1 provides a
counterexample showing that in the case of the deletion link axiom F, i.e., for the
combination of the Myerson values, the statement of Theorem 2 is not correct.
Indeed, consider the payoff vector φ(v,P, LP) given by the 〈F, F, F, F 〉-value φ that
in turn is the combination of the Myerson values, i.e., φi(v,P, LP) = µi(vµk(i), Lk(i)).
It is not difficult to see that
µ(vPL, LM ) = (0.5, 2, 3.5),
φ(v,P, LP) = (0.5, 1, 1, 23 , 2
7
60
,
43
60
).
However, φ(v,P, LP) does not belong to the core C(v,P, LP), since φN3 /∈ C(vµ3 , L3),
because φ4 + φ5 = 2
47
60
< vL33 ({4, 5}) = 2.8 = 2
48
60
(see Proposition 1).
Next two theorems are direct corollaries from Theorem 2.
First, since Proposition 1, the property of a payoff vector x ∈ IRn to belong to
the core C(v,P, LP), defined by (1), implies the weaker conditions of CEQ and CEU
together, the following theorem holds true.
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Theorem 3 If all DL axioms at issue are of the types CF, LE, UE, or EL, then the
〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-value of a superadditive PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 ∈ G¯DL
P ,{DLk}k∈M
N
is the unique core selector that satisfies axioms 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉.
Now let 〈v,P, LP〉 be a superadditive PG-game for which all graphs determining
the cooperation structure LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 are either cycle-free or line-graphs
and moreover, all graphs Lk, k ∈M , are connected, i.e., in fact graphs Lk, k ∈M ,
are either trees or line-graphs. Then there is a (m + 1)-tuple of the deletion link
axioms 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉 such that all axioms are of one of the types CF, LE, UE,
or EL and for which the cooperation structure LP = 〈LM , {Lk}k∈M 〉 is suitable.
However, we cannot guarantee that if among the graphs Lk, k ∈ M , some are dis-
connected, the cooperation structure within a priori unions {Lk}k∈M , is compatible
with DLP(vPL, LM ). But if we assume that all graphs Lk, k ∈ M , are connected,
then due to Remark 5.1 and by virtue of Theorem 2 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉(v,P, LP) ∈
C(v,P, LP). Thus, it turns out that the next theorem holds as well.
Theorem 4 For every superadditive PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 for which all graphs de-
termining the graph structure LP are either cycle-free or line-graphs and, moreover,
all graphs Lk, k ∈M , are connected, the core C(v,P, LP) is non-empty.
5.3 Harsanyi dividends
We consider now different 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-values with respect to the distribu-
tion of Harsanyi dividends. Since the worth of any coalition is equal to the sum
of Harsanyi dividends of the coalition itself and all its proper subcoalitions, the
Harsanyi dividend of a coalition has natural interpretation as the extra revenue of
the cooperation between the players of the coalition that they did not already realize
by cooperation in proper subcoalitions. How the value under scrutiny distributes
the dividend of a coalition among the players provides important information con-
cerning the interest of different players to create the coalition. This information
is especially important in games with limited cooperation structure when it might
happen that one player (or some group of players) is responsible for creation of a
coalition. If in such a case the player responsible for the creation of a coalition ob-
tains no quota from the dividend of this coalition she may simply block the creation
of this coalition at all. This happens, for example, with some values for games with
line-graph cooperation structure, see discussion concerning the topic in Brink, Laan,
and Vasil’ev [4].
The only coalitions allowed in graph games with coalition structure are either
the coalitions of entire a priori unions or subcoalitions within a priori unions. As it
follows from Theorem 1, formula (3), every 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-value is a combina-
tion of DLP -value in a quotient game and DLk-values, k ∈M , in the corresponding
games within a priori unions. Thus, any 〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉-value distributes the
dividend of a coalition containing the entire a priori unions according to the DLP -
value and the dividend of any subcoalition of an a priori union according to the
corresponding DLk-value.
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6 Generalization on games with level structure
Winter [15] introduced a generalization of the Owen value on games with level
structure. A level structure is a finite sequence of partitions L = (P1, ...,Pq) such
that every Pr, is a refinement of Pr+1, that is, if P ∈ Pr, then P ⊂ Q for some
Q ∈ Pr+1. For any coalition structure Pr, r = 1, . . . , q, denote by mr the number
of elements (a priori unions) in Pr and let Mr = {1, . . . ,mr}. In what follows we
assume that elements of each coalition structure Pr, r = 1, . . . , q, are given by Nkr ,
kr ∈Mr, i.e., Pr =
{
Nkr
}
kr∈Mr , for all r = 1, . . . , q.
Graph games with coalition structure, PG-games, can be naturally extended to
graph games with level structure. For a game with level structure it is assumed
that cooperation possible only either between single players within a priori unions
Nk1 , k1 ∈ M1, at the first level, or at each level r = 1, . . . , q − 1 among a priori
unions Nkr , Nlr ∈ Pr, kr, lr ∈ Mr, that simultaneously belong to the same a priori
union in the coalition structure at the next level, i.e., Nkr , Nlr ⊂ Nkr+1 ∈ Pr+1, or
among any a priori unions at the upper level q, and besides no cooperation is allowed
between elements from different levels. It is worth to stress that when we consider
cooperation among a priori unions we bear in mind a priori unions as entire units
and not as collections of single players or smaller subunions belonging to coalition
structures at the lower levels. The cooperation structure in this situation can be
specified by the system of graphs LL = 〈LMq , {{Lkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1〉, where a graph LMq
provides connections among a priori unions Nkq , kq ∈Mq, as single elements in the
coalition structure Pq at the upper level q; any graph Lkr , kr ∈ Mr, r = 2, . . . , q,
presents links between a priori unions as single elements in the coalition structure
Pr−1 at the level r−1 that belong to the same a priori union Nkr at the level r; and
graphs Lk1 , k1 ∈M1, connect single players within a priori unions Nk1 , k1 ∈M1, at
the first level. Fig. 3 illustrates a possible example of 2-level level structure endowed
with a level structure dependent graph structure.
Fig. 3
The combination of a TU game with level structure and with limited coopera-
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tion possibilities represented by means of level structure dependent graph structure
results in a so-called graph game with level structure (LG-game), given by a tuple
〈v,L, LL〉. Similar to PG-games, for LG-games the cooperation structure LL de-
pends on the level structure L only up to fixation of its nodes according to coalition
structures Pr, r = 1, . . . , q. Notice that in this context any PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 is a
LG-game 〈v,L, LL〉, with the 1-level level structure given by L = (P).
A LG-value is an operator ξ that assigns to any LG-game 〈v,L, LL〉 a payoff
vector ξ(v,L, LL) ∈ IRn.
We extend now the suggested approach to PG-values on LG-values. First we
adapt the component efficiency axioms CEQ and CEU to the case of LG-values.
A LG-value ξ is component efficient with respect to level structure (CEL) if, for
any LG-game 〈v,L, LL〉, LL = 〈LMq , {{Lkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1〉,
(i) for all k1 ∈M1, for any component C ∈ Nk1/Lk1 , C 6= Nk1 ,∑
i∈C
ξi(v,L, LL) = v(C),
(ii) for every level r = 2, . . . , q, for all kr ∈ Mr, for any component C ∈ Nkr/Lkr ,
C 6= Nkr , ∑
kr∈C
∑
i∈Nkr
ξi(v,L, LL) = vPr−1L(C).
(iii) for any component C ∈Mq/LMq ,∑
kq∈C
∑
i∈Nkq
ξi(v,L, LL) = vPqL(C).
Notice that for LG-games with at least two levels there are three conditions
of component efficiency instead of two given by axioms CEU and CEQ for PG-
games, because the graph structures within a priori unions at the intermediate levels
r = 2, . . . , q possess peculiar features of both, the graph structure within a priori
unions containing single players at the first level and the graph structure among
a priori unions at the upper level. For a PG-game 〈v,P, LP〉 presented by means
of a LG-game 〈v,L, LL〉, with the 1-level level structure one can easily check that
conditions (i) and (iii) of the component efficiency axiom CEL coincide with the
component efficiency axioms CEU and CEQ respectively.
A tuple of deletion link axioms 〈DLPq,{{DLkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1〉 is regarded with re-
spect to a LG-value in a similar way as a (m + 1)-tuple of deletion link axioms
〈DLP , {DLk}k∈M 〉 with respect to a PG-value.
To ensure that benefits of cooperation obtained by a priori unions at the levels
above can be fully distributed among elements of coalition structures at the levels
below, similar to PG-games it is assumed that the cooperation structures within
a priori unions {Lkr}kr∈Mr , r = 1, . . . , q, are compatible with the payoffs in the
graph quotient games at the levels above. For any tuple of deletion link axioms
〈DLPq , {{DLkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1〉, we consider a set of LG-games G¯DL
Pq ,{{DLkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1
N ,
defined similarly to the set of PG-games G¯DLP ,{DLk}k∈MN .
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Theorem 5 There is a unique LG-value defined on G¯DLPq ,{{DLkr}kr∈Mr}
q
r=1
N that
satisfies axioms CEQ, CEU, and 〈DLPq , {{DLkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1〉, and for any LG-game
〈v,L, LL〉 ∈ G¯DL
Pq ,{{DLkr}kr∈Mr}qr=1
N it is given by
ξi(v,L, LL) = DLk1(i)i (vDL
k2(i)
k1(i)
, Lk1(i)), for all i ∈ N,
where for all r = 2, . . . , q − 1, for any S ⊆ Nkr−1(i),
vDL
kr(i)
kr−1(i) (S) =
{
DL
kr(i)
kr(i)
(vDL
kr+1(i)
kr(i)
, Lkr(i)), S = Nkr−1(i),
vPr−1L(S), S $ Nkr−1(i),
and
vDL
kq(i)
kq−1(i) (S) =
{
DL
Pq
kq(i)
(vPqL, LMq), S = Nkq−1(i),
vPq−1L(S), S $ Nkq−1(i),
for all S ⊆ Nkq−1(i).
The proof of Theorem 5 is a straightforward generalization of the proof of The-
orem 1 and we leave it to the reader.
It is worth to mention that Theorems 2-4 for PG-games admit natural extensions
for LG-games as well.
7 Sharing a river with multiple users
Ambec and Sprumont [1] approach the problem of optimal water allocation for a
given river with certain capacity over the agents (countries) located along the river
from the game theoretic point of view. Their model assumes that between each
pair of neighboring agents there is an additional inflow of water. Each agent, in
principal, can use all the inflow between itself and its upstream neighbor, however,
this allocation in general is not optimal in respect to total welfare. To obtain more
profitable allocation it is allowed to allocate more water to downstream agents which
in turn can compensate the extra water obtained by side-payments to upstream ones.
The problem of optimal water allocation is approached as the problem of optimal
welfare distribution. Brink, Laan, and Vasil’ev [4] show that the Ambec-Sprumont
river game model can be naturally embedded into the framework of a graph game
with line-graph cooperation structure. Both papers mentioned consider each agent
as a single unit. We extend the model to multiple agents assuming that each agent
represents a community of users. However, in our model no communication and
therefore no cooperation is allowed between single users or proper subgroups of
users belonging to different agents, i.e., we do not consider the case of presence of
international firms having their branches at different levels along the river.
Let N =
⋃
k∈M Nk, such that Nk∩Nl = ∅ for all k, l ∈M , be a set players (users
of water) composed of the communities of players Nk, k ∈M , located along the river
and numbered successively from upstream to downstream. Let ek ≥ 0 be the inflow
of water entering the river between communities k − 1 and k, k ∈ M , with e1 the
inflow in front of the most upstream community N1. Moreover, we assume also that
each community is equipped by a connected pipe system binding all its members.
Without loss of generality we may assume that all graphs Lk, k ∈M , presenting the
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pipe systems within communities Nk, k ∈ M , are cycle free; otherwise it is always
possible to close some pipes responsible for cycles. Indeed, for a graph with cycles
one can consider a final set of cycle-free subgraphs with the same set of nodes as in
the original graph. It is not a problem to choose a cycle-free subgraph from this set
with respect to minimizing the technological costs of transporting the water within
the community. Fig. 4 provides a schematic representation of the model.
N1 N2 Nk Nm
e1 e2 ek em
Fig. 4
It is assumed that for each community Nk there is a quasi-linear utility func-
tion representing the cumulated utility of all players in Nk and which is given by
uk(xk, tk) = bk(xk)+tk where tk is a monetary compensation to community Nk, xk is
the amount of water allocated to Nk, and bk : IR+ → IR is a continuous nondecreas-
ing function providing benefit bk(xk) to community Nk through the consumption of
xk of water. Further, we assume that if the total shares of water for all communities
Nk, k ∈M , are fixed, then for each community Nk there is a mechanism presented
in terms of a TU game vk that allocates the water optimally to the players within
the community. We do not discuss how the games vk, k ∈ M , are constructed and
leave it open outside the scope of the paper.
In the model under scrutiny, no cooperation is allowed among single users from
different levels along the course of the river. Thus, the problem of optimal water
allocation fits the framework of the introduced above PG-game which solution is
given by a suitable PG-value that in turn is a combination of the solutions for a
line-graph game among the communities located along the river and cycle-free graph
games within each community. In accordance with the results obtained in [1], [4],
in the line-graph river game 〈v, L〉, v ∈ GM , L= {(k, k + 1)| k= 1, . . . ,m−1}, pro-
viding the optimal water distribution among communities Nk, k ∈ M , the game v
is superadditive; moreover, as it is shown in [4], if all functions bk are differentiable
with derivatives going to infinity as xk tends to zero, strictly increasing and strictly
concave, the game v appears to be convex. However, as it is also shown in [4], the
solution for the river game with singleton users suggested in Ambec and Sprumont
[1] that in fact coincides with the upper equivalent solution, though being a core
selector, is very contradictious from a perspective of the distribution of Harsanyi
dividends, because the upper equivalent solution gives the total dividend of a coali-
tion to the most downstream player while the creation of a coalition is fully up to the
most upstream one. From the point of view of reasonable distribution of Harsanyi
dividends the lower equivalent solution, the equal loss solution, the average tree
solution, and the Myerson value seem to be more attractive. Hence, for the solution
of the river game with multiple users it is reasonable to distribute water among
the communities located along the river applying the lower equivalent solution, the
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equal loss solution, the average tree solution, or the Myerson value and then to
apply the average tree solution for the distribution of shares obtained by each com-
munity among its members. Moreover, if all games vk, k ∈ M , determining the
water distribution within the communities are superadditive, all the solutions dis-
tributing water among the communities by the lower equivalent solution, the equal
loss solution, and the average tree solution, and then distributing water within the
communities by the average tree solution are selectors of the core of the river game
with multiple users. Furthermore, if the utility functions are such that the game
between the communities appears to be convex, the solution given by the combina-
tion of the Myerson value in the game between the communities and the average
tree solutions in the games within the communities is a core selector as well.
Final remark. When the paper was already completed and presented at SING’3
conference in Madrid, July 2007, I knew about a yet unpublished similar work done
independently by T. Kongo [8] also presented at SING’3 that studies a particular
case of the values introduced here – the combination of the Myerson values at both
levels, within a priori unions and between a priori unions. However the two-level
networks model of T. Kongo differs essentially from the model of a PG-game. In
that model the cooperation between a priori unions at the level of a priori unions
is regarded not in terms of entire a priori unions as single units but in terms of
single players belonging to this unions: if two a priori unions are connected then it
is assumed that all players in both a priori unions are connected among themselves,
even those that were not connected with each other at the level within a priori
unions. As a consequence of this special interpretation of the cooperation between
a priori unions the axiomatization for the combination of the Myerson values differs
from ours for that particular case.
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